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Multicultural Citizenship and New Migrations1
Tariq Modood
Introduction
A recognisable multiculturalism as a political idea has been a nation-
making or, more precisely, a nation-remaking project. Its primary 
purpose has been that of including into a reformed national citizen-
ship those who were marked by difference (racial, ethnic, cultural, 
etc.); and who often have a historical and continuing relationship of 
exclusion or oppression; and/or the fact of immigration, settlement 
and citizenship acquisition. Its fundamental question is how to rec-
oncile equal citizenship and a sense of belonging together (a shared, 
inclusive national identity) with the relevant kind of ‘difference’? 
While multiculturalism requires reconceiving citizenship and shared 
identities, it has assumed that a collectivity of citizens in the form of 
a state/polity has the right and the capacity to control immigration 
and that migrants want to be and should be accepted as citizens. 
But what if the nature of immigration (and other relevant circum-
stances) change such that difference is no longer so salient an issue, 
citizenship no longer seems to be so normatively prized by migrants; 
and immigration is less amenable to control? Does multiculturalism 
still have traction in these new circumstances? What is the relation-
ship between the post-immigration normative project of accommo-
dating citizens-marked-by-origin and the managing of current fl ows 
of migrations and mobilities? Is it the case that multiculturalism 
may continue to be a relevant political perspective in relation to 
the former but not the latter? If so, how are we to relate the two 
policy perspectives to each other? This chapter begins the process of 
considering these questions with some preliminary thoughts. This 
centres on concerns that multicultural citizenship has relatively little 
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to contribute to the regulation of immigration and yet the develop-
ment of any multiculturalism can be (negatively) affected by the 
pace, scale and nature of immigration that is not popularly sup-
ported or at least accepted.
I offer some normative conceptualisation of a national case, 
Britain, where immigration control and emergent multiculturalism 
have gone together. The British response, as formed by Labour and 
Liberal politicians and supported by many Conservatives, combined 
a policy of equal citizenship and immigration controls; a gradual 
evolving anti-racist multiculturalism within a national, internally 
plural citizenship. It was initially more focused on ‘colour’ and 
was indifferent to the national but in the 1990s evolved to also 
accommodate ethno-religious communitarianism as well as cultural 
hybridity within a plural Britishness. Challenged by perceptions 
that multiculturalism leads to segregation and separatism, at the 
same time recent migrations have shifted focus from ethno-religious 
‘difference’ to freedom of movement and alternative conceptions 
of multiculturalism that directly challenge the normative basis of 
immigration control. Hence my question, where does multicultural-
ism stand on immigration today? 
Multicultural national citizenship
By multiculturalism or British multiculturalism I do not simply mean 
laws and policies but a political idea and movement. Grounded in 
a concept of national citizenship and therefore a concept of equal-
ity, multiculturalism extends this concept of equal citizenship from 
uniformity of rights to recognition of difference; from anti-discrimi-
nation, challenging stereotypes to turning the negative into a positive 
identity rather than into an undifferentiated citizenship. This means 
that the concept of equality and rights is applied to groups not just 
individuals, though individual rights remain the bedrock of citizen-
ship. In addition to this qualifi cation of liberal individualism, mul-
ticulturalism disavows the ideal of a hands-off neutral state, instead 
offering political and institutional accommodation to marginalised 
groups. This does not just take place at a local level or in specifi c 
institutions but is followed through at a national level, including at 
the level of the national identity. Multiculturalism is a critique of 
assimilative nationalism or nation-building/maintenance in favour 
of the expanding and remaking of the national identity, remaking the 
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‘We’ in an inclusive way and faithful to our given yet changing iden-
tities (e.g. Kymlicka 1995, Parekh 2000/2006, Modood 2007/2013). 
One of the features of this multiculturalism is that it recognises the 
right of states to maintain or to intervene in relation to a sense of 
national belonging; that countries have a right to engage in ‘nation-
building’ – within limits. A corollary of this kind of multiculturalism 
that I have sketched, which is often left unstated, is that multicultur-
alism does not challenge the right of states to control immigration or 
‘mobilities’ – but may place limits on it and require that it goes hand 
in hand with the multiculturalism of above.
So, if this is what multiculturalism is, this is the basis for judg-
ing any policy or development, whether it is an economic or social 
policy or about the nature of citizenship and countryhood. Of 
course such a criterion may not by itself give us an answer to a 
policy question, for example, how many temporary work permits 
should be issued and after what period should permit holders be 
required to leave the country, or after what period of residence 
should they be allowed leave to remain permanently? Issues to do 
with employment rights, living standards, housing and so on would 
be in play as well as, say, considerations about fairness in the grant-
ing of work permits and the nurturing of a multicultural national 
citizenship. Here it is important to emphasise that multiculturalism 
was not originally a response to current migration but to migration 
of some decades earlier; it was a response to the changes brought 
about by the presence of settlers and by post-immigration genera-
tions. It was not about managing current migration but some chal-
lenges associated with citizens-marked-by-origin. Migration was 
the signifi cant pre-condition but multiculturalism is a politics of 
post-immigration or settlement, in which ‘difference’ and citizen-
ship is central. The prospect of a public philosophy which was a 
response to settlement having answers to questions about mobili-
ties, about non-settlement, must be treated with caution, as can be 
seen by thinking about the British case in detail. 
British migrations and multiculturalism
Each national multiculturalism has its own distinctive character. 
This is true of political concepts in general and is important for 
understanding the possibilities of adapting, extending or abandoning 
multiculturalism in order to respond to the political and normative 
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challenges of ‘a mobile world’. The national political culture and 
the state tradition will play an important part but so will different 
kinds of migrations, and different compositions of ethnic minori-
ties produce different kinds of multiculturalisms (c.f. the chapters 
by Kymlicka (6) and Levey (7)). We always, then, need to know 
something about the relevant migration and its interaction with the 
political system. My own normative concept of multiculturalism is 
most related to the British case. In this brief sketch I will highlight 
fi ve points that I think are important.
1. Equal Citizens. The post-war migrations were initially by ‘sub-
jects of the Crown’, namely subjects of the British Empire or a 
newly independent part of it moving from the periphery to the 
centre, to what West Indians referred to as ‘the Mother Country’ 
(Carter and Coussins 1986). As their numbers grew, there was 
a strong reaction against the migration and their right of free 
entry was successively curtailed from 1962 onwards. Neverthe-
less, as native residents of the UK themselves had no formal 
citizenship status except as subjects of the Crown (citizenship 
being formalised only in 1981), there was a certain formal civic 
equality in status between the immigrants and the natives. For 
example, the immigrants enjoyed the same franchise, access 
to public services and most welfare benefi ts as natives regard-
less of nationality and without being asked their nationality. 
Some immigrants appealed to the internal British connection 
by responding to those who said they were alien intruders by 
retorting: ‘We are over here because you were over there.’ 
2. Race. Beyond legal status and rights, the most salient feature 
of the immigrants from the point of view of British society was 
their ‘race’, the fact that they were ‘coloured’ or not white. Their 
second-class racial status – a legacy of the same Empire that now 
gave them rights equal to the natives – derived from this.
The implications of 1 and 2 taken together is that the rela-
tionship between the immigrants and Britain begins with equal 
rights in a context of racism which was strong enough to over-
ride some of those rights in practice (such as job opportunities) 
but not in law. The racism was also strong enough to create pub-
lic pressure upon politicians to regulate the fl ow of immigration 
(but not to reverse it). The response to this situation was from 
quite an early period to create laws to resist racial discrimination 
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within the country so that the legal equality of subjects of Queen 
Elizabeth II could be realised as social equality. This has proved 
a long process, with laws getting steadily stronger – contem-
poraneously always stronger than that of any other European 
country – and while some progress has been made, it is not yet a 
reality. These two linked responses of limiting immigration and 
seeking the reality of social equality were famously summarised 
in the 1960s by the Labour politician, Roy Hattersley: ‘Without 
integration limitation is inexcusable; without limitation, integra-
tion is impossible.’ Neither the legal controls on the scale and 
pace of immigration, nor even the racial equality activism are 
so distinctive to Britain as the fact that citizenship was taken for 
granted. It was not thought of as a prize, something to aim for 
or to withhold; nor was it the source of ‘otherness’ in the way 
that immigration, colour and culture were. This paved the way 
for the view that all subjects/citizens were British but not all the 
same kind of British or British in the same way. It took some 
decades to mature but the seeds of the idea of a plural Britishness 
have this historical depth, perhaps ultimately one of imperial leg-
acy and not just on the side of the white British but also on those 
who had brought with them concepts such as ‘Mother Country’. 
In Britain the politics of post-immigration begins not with issues 
about naturalisation and assimilation but with racial equality 
and challenging narrow, islander defi nitions of Britishness. 
3. Religion, As the diversity and distinctive character of different 
minority groups began to be recognised, racial equality was 
extended to cover ethnicity and religion. These two were not 
easily separated, as in the House of Lords decision that banning 
the wearing of the religious turban by Sikh men was actually a 
form of ethnic discrimination and therefore racial discrimina-
tion in law (Mandala v. Lee, 1982). As ethnic group pride and 
assertiveness became an accepted feature of and indeed the vehi-
cle for promoting equal citizenship, South Asian identities began 
increasingly to take an ethno-religious character. Non-whiteness 
remained a social divide but racism began to be thought of 
in terms of racisms and in compound forms such as cultural 
racism, anti-Muslim racism and so on. From the time of The 
Satanic Verses affair in the late 1980s Muslim political activism 
began to loom large in the emergent multiculturalism; and after 
9/11 in the US and the 7/7 suicide-bombings in London, it 
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became central to a multiculturalism that was being over-
whelmed by security concerns and, according to some observers, 
died (Kepel 2005).
It is a feature of British multiculturalism that while it is built 
on anti-racism to a greater extent than in most other countries 
and pioneered ethno-religious identity activism (initially Sikh, 
later Muslim), the provision of ‘mother-tongue’ teaching or 
multi-lingualism is relatively quite minor. Languages like Urdu 
or Hindi are provided within the curriculum by relatively few 
schools, though more are willing to enter their pupils for them 
in national exams like GCSEs (usually taken in Year 11), but it 
is expected that most of the necessary learning will have been 
acquired from the home and community. Some local authori-
ties and government agencies provide a few of their key pub-
lic communications (e.g. leafl ets) in some minority languages, 
though the practice is in decline as it is largely regarded as a ‘fi rst 
generation’ need, and many have come to think that it retards 
the acquisition of profi ciency in English, a goal that no multi-
culturalist would oppose in itself. The relativities in importance 
of race, religion and language in British multiculturalism is very 
much a refl ection of the political priorities of the ethnic minority 
communities and the campaigns they have mounted (Sivanandan 
1982; Modood 1992, 2005).
4. Plural Britishness. The ‘nation remaking’ referred to above 
involved some ‘deconstruction’ and opening-up but, by the 
same token, it involved more standard forms of nation-building 
or national culture maintenance. For example, the teaching of 
the national language2 and heritage at school; or state support 
for a dominant religion or differential relationship between the 
state and religions, given that one of them was ‘established’. So, 
the kind of ethnocultural criteria that could not be openly or 
formally used in the selection of immigrants could be used in the 
management of the public culture. 
5. New Migrations. From about the 1990s, migration fl ows 
changed considerably. They were no longer primarily of a post-
imperial kind (which in any case by this time had been largely 
restricted to spouses and family unifi cations). People escaping 
war-torn areas predominated (Bosnia, Afghanistan, Somalia, 
Turkey (Kurds), Iraq stand out). There were others from even 
more diverse origins, though especially from the Middle East 
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and Africa, looking for work and a better life (the same motives 
as earlier migrants). To some extent they could be considered as 
late additions to the demographic and political multicultural-
ism that was emerging, because while they did not necessarily 
share a historical connection with Britain (though some clearly 
did, such as those from say Nigeria and Ghana), they mostly 
shared the two most prominent characteristics that multicul-
turalism was challenging Britain to accept, non-whiteness and 
being Muslim. As the British economy, public services, cultural 
institutions and universities became internationalised the num-
ber of work permits offered to high-skilled professionals and 
business people grew greatly. Finally, one of the most signifi cant 
new migrations was that of nationals from fellow EU member 
states, who in a twist of fate came to enjoy the freedom of entry 
and rights that ‘subjects of the Crown’ enjoyed during 1948–
1962. Despite key strands of continuity, especially the elements 
of cheap labour, ‘colour’ and being Muslim, the post-imperial 
and therefore British connection and the dimension of ‘race’ 
was remade. The latter includes both that white (EU) migrants 
had rights of entry and settlement over non-whites, but also that 
white migrants too experience some negative ‘othering’ (Fox 
et al. 2012). A key stabilising condition which British multicul-
turalism was built on, immigration control, was however – as 
we now see – put at risk by the UK’s acceptance of the Maas-
tricht Treaty provision of freedom of movement for EU citizens, 
which in the fullness of time derailed the twin-track approach of 
immigration control and equality. If it is the case, as cited above, 
that Muslims killed multiculturalism, then we can say that the 
EU freedom of movement has also made a contribution. The 
current EU combination of rejection of national multicultural-
ism and prohibition of limiting the entry of EU states’ nationals 
seems to be a rejection of both parts of the British formula.3
While it is not the case that the reduction of entry for those from 
the Commonwealth was caused by the opening up to the EU (the 
former preceded the latter), the de facto effect of this major policy 
shift has been a preference for white people from relatively pros-
perous countries. Of course there is nothing in principle to stop the 
UK being open to people from both prosperous and poor coun-
tries, though there is bound to be some competition between the 
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two types of migrants where a country is trying to reduce the pace 
and scale of migration and is only able to deny entry to one but 
not the other kind of migrant. The competition is therefore based 
on the fact that the UK is only able to regulate non-EU mobilities 
(while it is a member of the EU).
One of the results of these new migrations is for the govern-
ment to create new requirements for naturalisation, primarily 
the introduction of a citizenship test and requiring profi ciency in 
English, and to start celebrating British citizenship through cere-
monies for those who have newly acquired it (Brooks 2016). Given 
the great and continuing expansion of the kind of citizenship and 
migrant diversity now found in many English cities and towns, a 
new analytical framework has been offered to capture it as a socio-
demographic phenomenon, termed ‘super-diversity’, but it has not 
produced an alternative policy approach except to point out that it 
does not and probably will not fi t easily into British multicultural-
ism (Vertovec 2007).
Besides highlighting the specifi c character of British multicul-
turalism, the main purpose of this section is to emphasise two 
points. Firstly, multiculturalism in Britain developed alongside a 
restrictive immigration policy. Perhaps it was regarded as a price 
for multiculturalism, but it was in the main not engaged with by 
most multiculturalists, except in terms of demanding that it be 
non-discriminatory, and in relation to its most egregious manifes-
tations.4 Some anti-racists were against the kinds of immigration 
policies that were pursued (not just by Conservative but also by 
Labour governments) from 1962 onwards, mainly because they 
argued that controls implied that immigrants were the problem 
rather than the general level of racism in the country (Sivanandan 
1982). But in the main, as multiculturalism emerged as a distinct 
political idea it did not radically challenge the bipartisan consensus 
or itself focus very much on immigration. Political theorists who 
emerged as advocates of multiculturalism in the 1980s and 1990s 
in Britain (and, actually, elsewhere too) did not have much to say 
about immigration policy but focused on the political and ethical 
challenges in relation to post-immigration inclusion, participation 
and needs of minorities in relation to equal civic status, national 
discourses and the public culture. Political theorists of multicul-
turalism have not written much on immigration and immigration 
control (Joe Carens 1987 and 2013 being an exception), but in 
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general their implicit position seems to have been that whilst immi-
gration has been and continues to be of benefi t to countries such 
as those of Western Europe and North America, and immigration 
controls have been explicitly or implicitly racist and emphatically 
should not be, a country can have ‘a moral right to its territo-
rial and cultural integrity including the right to limit the entry of 
outsiders’ (Parekh 2006). Multiculturalists have accepted this fun-
damental moral right. Just as, analogously, one can accept that for-
eign investment is of benefi t to one’s country without suggesting 
that it is always of benefi t, or the scale of overseas ownership is not 
important or that overseas investors have a right to invest in our 
country if the returns earned are higher in our country than their 
own (or elsewhere).5
Secondly, multiculturalism assumed that the immigrants were 
becoming a settled population and that they either already had citi-
zenship or were on a pathway to full citizenship, and so becoming 
an integral part of Britain. In relation to these developments, in 
particular the growing into adulthood of a British-born ‘second 
generation’, multiculturalism challenged a top-down, static, mono-
nationalism. It promoted ideas of new identities, hyphenated or 
multiple identities and was accepting of dual nationality but saw 
the goal as all citizens, including members of settled ethnic minori-
ties, coming to have, as expressed by the Commission on the Future 
of Multi-Ethnic Britain report, ‘a sense of belonging to society as 
a whole’ (CMEB 2000: 49). For the CMEB report (aka the Parekh 
Report) this sense of sharing a common fate with fellow citizens 
and nationals was achieved when people feel ‘that their own fl our-
ishing as individuals and as communities is intimately linked with 
the fl ourishing of public institutions and public services’ (CMEB 
2000: 49). The report insisted that this sense of belonging required 
two important conditions: the idea that one’s polity should be rec-
ognised as a community of communities as well as a community 
of individuals; and the challenging of all racisms and related struc-
tural inequalities (CMEB 2000: 56). 
In the more recent period when the scale of immigration/mobil-
ities exceeds that of the 1950s–1980s and where fewer immigra-
tion controls are available (none in relation to the EU6) or effective, 
it is a challenge to work out what multiculturalism has got to say 
about current mobilities or how it needs to be adapted in the light 
of the latter. 
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Multiculturalism and immigration control
If we now bring in other countries we can generalise somewhat 
the point that there has been no logical or privileged connection 
between multiculturalism and immigration policy. For example, 
on the one hand, multiculturalist countries such as Canada and 
Australia led the way in being choosy between applicants, scoring 
them on the basis of the needs of the country (see the Kymlicka and 
Levey chapters (6 and 7 respectively)). On the other hand, coun-
tries who declared themselves opposed to multiculturalism could 
have extensive and less choosy immigration and be very keen on 
turning immigrants into citizens, like France; or be very generous 
in relation to asylum seekers and refugees while being heteropho-
bic within a mono-ethnocultural conception of citizenship, such as 
Germany or Greece. And of course different EU countries could 
experience different scales of migration from within the EU and 
have different views on its contribution to the country. Singapore’s 
version of multiculturalism, ‘multi-racialism’ is closely tied to 
labour migration policies designed to maintain the existing demo-
graphic proportions between the Chinese, Indians and Muslims. 
The Gulf States are completely dependent on migration but grant 
residency or equal status in exceptional cases.
So, even though multiculturalism has had little to say about 
immigration policy, regarding it as a separate policy area to the ques-
tion of the relations between citizens and the remaking of national 
citizenship to respectfully include difference (see Lægaard’s chapter 
(11)), nevertheless there is a connection that has been asserted by 
the broad centre of British politics since the 1960s, as intimated in 
the Hattersley quote above. A recent version of aspects of it can be 
found in this statement by former Prime Minister David Cameron:
People have understandably become frustrated. It boils down to one 
word: control. People want Government to have control over the num-
ber of people coming here and the circumstances in which they come, 
both from the world and from within the European Union. They want 
control over who has the right to receive benefi ts and what is expected 
of them in return. (Cameron 2014)
It is a sentiment that is not peculiar to Conservatives or to Britain.7 
Of course there is another rising sentiment across Europe and the 
US that is xenophobic, racist or Islamophobic. The two sentiments 
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can be linked, with the former leading to or strengthening the 
latter, as recently expressed by the Australian Minister for Justice, 
Michael Keenan, at the Inter-parliamentary Conference on Com-
bating Antisemitism in Berlin: ‘We know that the public’s tolerance 
for cultural diversity improves when they are secure in the knowl-
edge that borders are being managed appropriately.’
I think Cameron’s statement captures a genuine sentiment about 
lack of control in relation to the scale and pace of fl ows and can be 
felt by ethnic minorities, just as they feel other effects perceived by 
white citizens, such as downward pressure on low wages or strain on 
local services. ‘Genuine’ in two senses: the sentiment is sincere, not 
contrived, the reasons given are operative; as well as that they are 
reasonable concerns. In some cases, perhaps even in a lot of cases, 
there may be mixed motives, and the mixture may include xeno-
phobia, Islamophobia, racial prejudice and so on, but the concern 
in question is not reducible to these, can and does exist without rac-
ism, and so has to be considered in its own right: it may be accepted 
even where the racism is rejected (Katwala et al. 2014). Moreover, 
while it is known that the media, especially the tabloid press, can 
exacerbate the sentiment, it does not mean that the sentiment does 
not have to be addressed. Some perceptions about the scale and 
effects of migration are likely to be mistaken and so while they can-
not be regarded as self-validating, neither can they be ignored. The 
situation is similar to when we take perceptions of racial discrimi-
nations as an indication but not proof that discrimination is taking 
place; an indication that there may be a problem that should not be 
dismissed but requires investigation and discussion.
As noted by Keenan such anxieties can have effects on intol-
erance, racism and on attitudes needed to make multiculturalism 
work. Multiculturalists will insist that immigration policy, pro-
spective migrants and migrants are not talked about in ways that 
undermine the sense of citizenship of ethnic minorities in their own 
eyes and/or in the eyes of others. Indeed, that all groups of peo-
ple, including prospective immigrants and more generally, should 
be spoken of and visually represented respectfully, and that ques-
tions of policy should not be in terms of negative discourses about 
immigrants or groups of people. One will want to attack the anti-
immigration rhetoric and the concept of the nation implicit in that 
discourse; yet, it is important to do so in a way that will not infl ame 
but dampen down that rhetoric and movement by addressing some 
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of the reasonable concerns of the public. The risks to existing 
majority–minority relations should be considered not just in rela-
tion to discourses but also in relation to the effects of the immigra-
tion policies themselves. Restrictions on immigration may be an 
appropriate policy response.8 Such policies must not be discrimi-
natory on the basis of race, ethnicity and religion but they could 
rank by other categories those seeking admissions, e.g. give lesser 
priority to temporary workers. In the present context of a major 
humanitarian crisis in relation to Syrian refugees trying to make 
their way into Europe, it is worth thinking about letting those EU 
countries who take a large share of refugees being able to tempo-
rarily restrict other mobilities, e.g. people looking for work across 
national borders in the EU (assuming that this could be properly 
agreed, which perhaps is not very likely at the moment). Whatever 
restrictions or selections are applied must be consistent with what 
David Miller calls the ‘weak cosmopolitanism premise’, meaning 
here that the policy ‘must offer relevant reasons to those excluded’, 
showing that their claims have been counted but outweighed by 
other considerations which they can recognise as reasonable con-
siderations even if they would weigh the considerations differently 
(Miller 2015: 400).
Cosmopolitanism 
I hope that what I have so far characterised as multiculturalism, 
especially in its British variant, resonates with a normative political 
orientation as found in academic political theory, in some activist 
campaigns and government actions, as well as with wider pub-
lic discourses and actions within professions such as teachers and 
social workers and other elements of civil society. Taken together 
there has not been a perfect alignment of positions but neverthe-
less I think a distinct body of ideas and claims can be discerned. 
A multiculturalism consisting of:
• Equality and integration through a shared and remade national 
citizenship, partly derived from a shared, albeit confl icted history.
• Anti-racism and ethno-religious accommodation as well as indi-
vidual rights.
• Backdropped by controlling the pace and scale of immigration 
(while appreciating the benefi ts of migration to the country).
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Yet, I have been not completely straight with you so far. I have 
called these political ideas ‘multiculturalism’ as a strategy of pre-
sentation. What I have kept temporarily suppressed and now 
bring into play is that in more or less the same period of time that 
what I have called ‘multiculturalism’ emerged, there also emerged 
another position which too has some claim to be called multicul-
turalist and indeed is often referred to as such. Actually, the two 
positions are often referred to as ‘multiculturalism’ and when this 
is done many people are unaware that they are referring to two 
distinct positions. My strategy of presentation is based on avoid-
ing such a confusion.
I will call this version of multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism. It 
is self-consciously offered as a critique and alternative to what I 
have so far referred to as multiculturalism and will continue to do 
so and also abbreviate to MC. Some of its key points (I shall be 
brief, for a longer discussion see Modood 2012 and Modood 2013: 
chapter 7) are that no minority group can be understood as being 
homogeneous or having a common ‘essence’ such that all members 
think alike or engage in all the same cultural practices in the same 
way. Yet MC speaks, it is claimed, as if they are when it speaks of 
a group being ‘different’ or ‘recognising’ a group or accommodat-
ing its cultural needs (Valluvan 2016). If we really want to under-
stand a multicultural society then we cannot speak about groups 
in the normative and reifi ed way that MC does but should look 
at the internal diversity within each group, and how it overlaps 
with all other groups, so that no group is really as different or dis-
tinct as multiculturalist theory and politics assumes. This is evident 
if we stop speaking at the level of national models and national 
policies and study cities, localities and everyday experiences and 
see how urban life manages very well without normative theory 
(Wise and Velayutham, 2009). People rub along together and nego-
tiate their differences without resort to the rhetorics of group iden-
tity politics, which are usually confi ned to political entrepreneurs 
who do not represent anybody other than themselves and their 
cabals (Malik 2015). In everyday multiculturalism people become 
indifferent to group identities and relate to each other through multi-
ple social roles such as neighbours, colleagues, users of local schools 
and public services and so on. Through this common multiculture, 
cross-cultural or mixed relationships become common and new 
shared, hybridic cultures emerge that may or may not resonate with 
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ideas of national identity and normative citizenship (Matejskova 
and Antonsich 2015; Cantle 2016). Recent and ongoing mobilities 
have brought people from so many backgrounds to countries like 
those of Western Europe that differentiated policies and group poli-
tics is impossible. Moreover, these more fi ne-textured, sociologi-
cal, anthropological and psychological approaches will show that 
migrants as well as later generations may remain connected to their 
countries of origins or to certain diasporas and imagined transna-
tional communities such as a black Atlantic diaspora or an ummah, 
and these transnational networks, ways of living and self-identities 
are more real than national identities, multiculturalist or otherwise 
(Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004).
A good way to evaluate the relationship between these two ver-
sions of muliticulturalism is to deploy the concepts of macro and 
micro. By their own self-defi nitions the fi rst multiculturalism is 
focused on the macro (national citizenship) and the second on the 
micro (everyday experience). Conceived as such, cosmopolitanism 
is not a radical critique of political multiculturalism but highlights 
its limited scope and supplements it where it is silent. It is qualify-
ing rather than replacing MC. If however there is a more radical 
critique taking place then it can be identifi ed by giving macro–
micro an alternative meaning. Not national–local/everyday but, 
rather, understanding the macro as the intellectual-political frame 
and the micro as localised empirical accounts. Here the critique is 
that empirical accounts of a multicultural society cannot be gener-
ated within the framework of a national multicultural citizenship, 
so that has to be replaced by a cosmopolitan framework of analy-
sis. For example, in some studies the discovery of the importance 
of city identities often too quickly leads to the conclusion that 
national identities are not or should not be a focus of promoting 
commonalities amongst diverse groups as the city is the best unit 
for this purpose. Of course this does not follow as there is no need 
to work with an either-or model, a truth nicely illustrated by the 
slogan adopted in the naturalisation campaign work in a German 
city: ‘Hamburg. My port. Germany. My Home.’9
It may be thought that cosmopolitanism may be more suited to 
some of the new mobilities. It prizes individual freedom regardless 
of people’s origins or their identity today or group membership (in 
fact group membership is often perceived as only a constraint not 
as a source of security for and development of an individual) and 
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is not normatively wedded to a national citizenship. So, perhaps 
it is more desirable or suited to conditions today than MC. I do 
not want to deny that possibility, but note something which does 
not rest on that claim. Firstly, given the contrast that I have drawn 
between full-blooded cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism at the 
macro-frame level, it should be clear that cosmopolitanism can-
not take on board most of MC in the sense of encompassing it 
or creating a synthesis with it. So, it could only replace MC if the 
problems that MC addresses no longer needed addressing or could 
be addressed by cosmopolitanism. Yet neither of these is true. The 
problems of anti-racism, ethno-religious group ‘difference’, asser-
tion and accommodation are live, ongoing issues and despite the 
progress made they have become larger and more pressing, as col-
lected together under the rubric of ‘integration’. Moreover it is dif-
fi cult to see how cosmopolitanism could digest a multiculturalism 
based on concepts of national citizenship and group accommoda-
tion, when its take on such concepts is intellectually and norma-
tively negative.
Yet it has to be granted that cosmopolitanism does make a con-
tribution of its own and that this contribution is evident in the 
light of some recent trends, and which it is fair to say MC has 
a less good traction with. It seems, then, that we need both MC 
and cosmopolitanism and should advocate both as complementary 
(pace some of the advocates of each, who see them in a competitive 
relation). 
This leaves open the question of whether they can be synthesised 
or brought together as part of a larger intellectual-political frame-
work. I doubt that they can. The point I want to emphasise is that 
both are important and relevant to our circumstances, that neither 
is an adequate substitute for the other, and so they are less competi-
tors and more complementary (Modood 1998). If they are rivals, 
they can be friendly rivals. We should not feel that we have to 
choose between them, that they are exclusive of each other. Rather, 
we should exploit the scope for mutual learning (Modood 2016). 
At least this has been my position to date when I have focused on 
domestic policy (matters relating to the fi rst two bullet points at the 
start of this section). Challenged by the theme of this book to think 
about immigration, perhaps we get to a point where complemen-
tarity of the ‘both . . . and . . .’ reaches its limit. If the immigration 
policy which resonates with cosmopolitanism is something like the 
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view that given the growing transnational character of life in coun-
tries like Britain – and especially so in the context of freedom of 
movement for citizens of member states within the EU – and given 
that people who wish to enter, temporarily or permanently, are 
large in number, and many are escaping conditions of war, persecu-
tion, economic underdevelopment, unemployment and poverty, we 
should, it is argued, have a much more open immigration policy, 
perhaps extending the freedom of movement pioneered by the EU 
to people coming from outside the EU too (for a powerful state-
ment that makes a claim like this at its boldest, see Carens 2013). 
Then it is diffi cult to see what complementarity could be like on this 
point. While it is possible to have a multiculturalism that encom-
passes group accommodation and culturally independent, mixed 
individuals, it is diffi cult to see how to compromise between the 
view that a multicultural society requires control of immigration 
and the view that it requires freedom of movement across borders. 
It is true that freedom of movement in the EU is restricted to 
nationals of EU states (and so is not consistent with cosmopolitan 
open borders, though the two seem to be confl ated in the minds 
of some) but this then creates an advantage for one category of 
migrants at the expense of other categories, which will be more 
controlled where a state seeks to exercise some control. Where a 
public believes that immigration is excessive and insuffi ciently reg-
ulated there will be anxiety; it will not be confi ned to the major-
ity and is likely to manifest itself in hostility to migrants but also 
ethnic minority citizens, and therefore damage the prospects of 
multiculturalism. 
Conclusion
The preliminary answer to the question of what multiculturalism 
has to say about new migrations and mobilities, at least in the 
British case, is that it does not sit well with it. British multicultur-
alism was developed in a context of immigration control and does 
not challenge the right of the state to control immigration, while 
insisting that it must not be exercised in ways that are discrimina-
tory in relation to the composite and overlapping criteria of race, 
ethnicity and religion that are at the heart of post-immigration 
British multiculturalism. Recent perceptions by a large propor-
tion of the British public that the pace and scale of immigration 
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has been too high and too unregulated are based on a number 
of factors, which can include racism and xenophobia, which are 
damaging to multiculturalism and have to be challenged. A related 
factor can be cultural identity questions which cannot be simply 
dismissed as majoritarian, let alone as majoritarian prejudice. 
Multiculturalism is a national identity remaking project, which 
may in some circumstances lead to legitimate questions about 
the identity effects of immigration, including its effects on exist-
ing citizens and minority groups, as well as of the possible conse-
quences of large-scale migration fl ows per se, and of people who 
are admitted on the understanding that they are not to be thought 
of as on a pathway to settlement and national citizenship. While 
a cosmopolitan version of multiculturalism is also present in Brit-
ain and is largely compatible with a more political, communitar-
ian multiculturalism, the two seem to have incompatible views on 
immigration control. 
Multiculturalism has to engage with migration at three levels. 
Firstly, identifying and opposing negative/racist/othering discourses, 
actions and policies against migrants, no less than citizens (whilst 
recognising that some citizenship-constituting rights and opportuni-
ties will not be available to migrants, e.g. rights of residence or access 
to full welfare benefi ts). Secondly, protecting/promoting the policies, 
forms of governance and understanding that constitute the core of 
post-immigration multiculturalism, especially in relation to accom-
modation and civic recognition of ethnic minority citizens and accom-
modation of ethno-religious groups. Thirdly, protecting/promoting 
the project of multicultural Britishness, the multicultural nation-
building project. Cosmopolitanism is very strong on the fi rst of these 
but ambivalent on the second and gives up on the third. There is the 
further post-Brexit task of integrating what may be approximately 
3 million new Euro-Brits. In some ways, given their whiteness, this 
will be relatively easy; in other ways, the white supremacism of some 
of them (Fox 2013) threatens to re-valorise whiteness in Britishness 
if they seek to marginalise black and brown Britons and to leap-
frog over them as generations of European migrants have done over 
African-Americans in the US. This may be one of the new ‘frontiers’ 
of British multiculturalism that will have to be engaged with as 
British multiculturalism continues to evolve and expand.
My modest theoretical conclusion is that in relation to multi-
cultural citizenship, multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism are 
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compatible as long as the latter operates at the micro level, supple-
menting and qualifying without displacing multiculturalism at the 
macro level. However, this compatibility may not extend to immi-
gration control, where we are forced to choose between multicul-
turalism and cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitan drift in general and 
specifi cally on immigration may be desirable and may be taking 
place amongst those who think of themselves as pro-diversity but 
we need to acknowledge that this is not the multiculturalism of, say, 
Kymlicka nor Parekh, nor is it mine. In relation to the substantive 
politics, I cannot help but think that multiculturalism, while con-
tinuing to point out the ongoing benefi ts of immigration, should 
reaffi rm immigration control. Of course, this must be within the 
context of and within the limits of reaffi rming that multicultur-
alism is a citizenship-based nation-remaking project. Which is 
another way of saying that I am still committed to the multicultur-
alism which was discussed at the original EUI conference in 1996, 
which the 2016 conference was inspired to honour. The incompat-
ibility between multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism in relation 
to migration is seriously problematic for progressive politics today 
but is one to which I cannot yet see a solution.
Notes
 1. I am grateful for helpful comments and challenges by Jan Dobbernack, John 
Denham, Jon Fox, Sunder Katwala, Mike Kenny, Geoffrey Levey, Nasar 
Meer, Bhikhu Parekh, Jonathan Rutherford, Mark Sivarajah, Terri-Anne 
Teo, Simon Thompson, Anna Triandafyllidou and Varun Uberoi, and I am 
aware that I have not met most of the challenges but am encouraged they 
saw value as well as diffi culties in the chapter. I can, however, sincerely say 
that none can be held responsible for my arguments.
 2. Including Welsh in Wales.
 3. Which I hasten to add is not a suffi cient argument for Britain to leave the EU. 
Nor is it to say that Brexit will necessarily repair the damage; given how it 
has emboldened racists of various kinds, the negative effect on multicultural-
ism may continue and get worse. My point is simply that the EU freedom of 
movement has had a cost for multicultralism in the UK.
 4. Most notoriously, virginity tests, carried out on eighty prospective brides 
from the South Asian subcontinent in the 1970s, see https://www.theguard-
ian.com/lifeandstyle/2011/may/13/virginity-tests-uk-immigrants-1970s
 5. In effect saying to overseas investors: we know we are denying you an equal 
opportunity to invest but national interest considerations must sometimes 
trump global equal opportunities to invest.
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 6. Originally written before the Brexit referendum, it is still unclear what rights 
of entry to the UK for EU citizens will be negotiated in the Brexit deal. 
 7. It may however soften the paradox that it is the country with the most 
developed multiculturalism and the strongest equality laws in Europe which 
should vote to leave a supranational union. Many Labour politicians have 
come round to the same view, perhaps including Jeremy Corbyn, who 
announced on 10 January 2017 that ‘Labour is not wedded to freedom of 
movement’, see http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/10/labour-not-
wedded-freedom-movement-jeremy-corbyns-brexit-speech/ 
 8. The kind of multiculturalism I am outlining assumes therefore the continu-
ing right of states to control immigration. Of course it may pool it as per 
Schengen or as per ‘freedom of movement’ in the EU, but it does not have to 
be absolute; and pooling also suggests that it is not necessarily permanent, 
that there is a possibility under certain circumstances of the relevant power 
being taken back to itself by each of the sovereign states. In the absence of a 
clear mechanism for asking for some or all of it back, it would seem as if an 
element of sovereignty has not been pooled but transferred. In any case, even 
EU member states believe they have the right to restrict the entry of nationals 
from those outside the EU.
 9. See http://citiesofmigration.ca/good_idea/hamburg-my-port-germany-my-home/ 
referenced in Katwala et al. 2016.
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